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Increasing the transparency of
Government activities and establishing a
broad dialog with the public are among
the key priorities of the current
Administration in Ukraine. Existing
procedures, that is, launching public
discussions only after a draft regulatory
document has been made public
contributes little to the dialog between
the government and the people as it
happens only at the last stage of the
decision-making process.
Green and White Papers improve
both dialog and policy
These public documents on government
policy help significantly improve the
level and quality of dialog between a
Government and interest groups, and the
quality of policy decisions as a whole.
They bring in stakeholders at the early
stages of a Government decision, when
the issue is being identified, the roots of
the problem analyzed, options for
solving the problem formulated and
evaluated, and the best solution
discovered. This significantly improves
the level of public involvement. It also
helps expand the preliminary support
base for a particular policy decision and
ensures greater success in
implementation.
Thinking about the interests of all
stakeholders contributes to more
effective public policy reform. The
current series of discussions confirmed
once again that this public policy tool is
the only alternative to solving many
urgent problems in government policy
priorities. Moreover, public debates
around a Green Paper dealing with a
particular policy and considering the
positions of all stakeholders are the only
way that Ukraine will be able to develop
new, balanced policies that meet EU
requirements.
For instance, the discussion of “On
strengthening the role of the electricity
regulator” produced by the National
Energy Regulatory Commission (NERC)
revealed that current policy does not
match the balance of interests among
power consumers, producers and
suppliers. The existing decision-making
process meant that the interests of
consumers were being ignored and the
“ad hoc” management of the sector
reflected the corporate interests of only
one of the sides. 
Public policy debates enhance
institutional capacity for
Twinning
Twinning projects are intended to
transfer and effectively apply the
expertise of administrative professionals
from EU Member States to benefit
countries like Ukraine. The preparation
and implementation of the first
Twinning projects confirmed that one of
the main problems in identifying issues,
goals and objectives for projects that
suit Ukraine’s eurointegration strategy
is the inadequate capacity of the
country’s central executive, the project
beneficiaries, for strategic planning.
Work on the Green Papers had a clear
positive impact on the quality of
preparation for Twinning, in the opinion
of EU experts. In particular, materials
and recommendations of the Green Paper
prepared by the NERC and the Ministry
of Transport actually became part of the
process of preparing terms of reference
for Twinning projects. This shows that
even the PAGs intermediate results are
showing their usefulness. 
Policy analysis encourages a
clear position on national
interests
During political dialog, Ukraine’s options
to identify and defend its interests are
limited for lack of prior policy analysis
and, unlike their EU counterparts,
Ukrainian negotiators are frequently
unprepared. Yet, policy analysis makes 
it possible to have a clear vision of a
particular problem and to develop
realistic alternatives for a successful
solution. Establishing and keeping 
a clear position based on national
interests is critical in negotiations 
with the EU.
The “Setting up 10 Policy Analysis Groups
(PAGs) under Ukraine’s Executive Bodies”
Project is being implemented by the
International Centre for Policy Studies 
on commission of the Center for the
Institutional Development of the Civil
Service under the Main Civil Service
Administration. 
For additional information, contact Project
Manager Oleksandr Safin by phone at
(380-44) 484-4400 or via e-mail at
osafin@icps.kiev.ua.
The discussions of nine Green Papers that were part of a project called “Setting up
10 Policy Analysis Groups (PAGs) under Ukraine’s Executive Bodies” have ended.
Having drafted Green Papers on some of the most painful issues in the country’s
economic and political life, government specialists are slowly mastering the
methods of public policy—a proven instrument to support the work of a
democratic government and bureaucracy. The debates clearly showed that the
practice of setting up PAGs under central executive bodies needs to continue
The executive branch gets used 
to public policy
By the way...
• The “Impact of NGOs on the Formation
and Implementation of Party
Platforms” Project is putting together
its preliminary results. Regional NGOs
are analyzing the impact of election
platforms, NGOs, and the media on the
results of elections in selected cities
and regions.
• The second series of workshops of the
Conference Board of Canada took place
20–22 June 2006 for the purpose of
evaluating potential output.
• The first series of public consultations
with stakeholders on the EU–Ukraine
free trade agreement started 20 June. 
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In the next few years, there is little reason
to expect a default. The Budget deficit,
which ICPS economists expect will not be
more than 2.5% of GDP in 2006, is not high
by world standards and is quite acceptable
for Ukraine. The margin formed over the
years when the country’s economy as a
whole and exports in particular grew
rapidly has strengthened Ukraine’s capacity
to resist various shocks. Still, if the new
Government does not react in time to
challenges that the economy is facing, the
likelihood of a default will grow.
Risks
The main factor that might lead to a
default is a substantial Budget deficit. This
tends to lead to rapid rising debt, risks and
interest rates. These, in turn, push debt up.
The Budget deficit might grow for two
reasons: inadequate Budget revenues—
taxes, customs duties and so on—and
growing expenditures. The risk is even
higher when there is a large double deficit,
that is, a high Budget deficit coupled with
a high balance of payments deficit. This
was the situation on the eve of the 1998
financial crisis. 
Over the last few years, there occasionally
were serous deviations from planned
indicators for specific items of Budget
revenues. Still, the collection of Budget
revenues did not generally deviate wildly
from the plan. This means that today the
main threats are: (1) developing and
approving ungrounded and overstated
indicators for the 2007 State Budget; 
(2) extending tax exemptions to
businesses that supported the government
in the elections; (3) raising social benefits,
which was promised by all political parties
that are now in the Rada; (4) refusing to
sequester the 2006 State Budget because
of an overall deterioration in the economy.
Precisely such steps contain the main risks
that the government’s capacity to fulfill its
commitments might decline and they
should be watched for. If the social
orientation of state policies continues to
strengthen, it could lead to serious
problems. 
Other possible risks are far less important
today. For instance, a change in the hryvnia
exchange rate, which has been raised again
recently, should not lead to problems with
servicing the country’s foreign debt,
provided the central bank has adequate
reserves. The current deterioration of the
balance of payments is also not critical to
Ukraine’s position. This process is being
accompanied by an influx of foreign
capital—both as direct investment and as
international borrowings— that, so far, is
not speculative. As a rule, speculative
money comes to a country when a steep
change in the exchange rate is expected.
Diagnosis
At the moment, Ukraine shows no
symptoms of a pending default. The
country has extended deadlines for
repaying both its domestic and foreign
loans. Although reduced interest rates
have been largely the result of a global
trend towards cheaper money that has
been observed for several years now, the
reduction of risks for investing in Ukraine
has been a major achievement of the
country.
Growing private sector foreign debt does
raise certain concerns. Over the last two
years, the total debt of private companies
in Ukraine has grown to double the
national debt. According to MinFin data,
total foreign debt was US $11bn as of early
May. Moreover, private sector foreign loans
will continue to grow at a rapid pace—
US $3–4bn per annum. In the near future,
large Ukrainian financial and industrial
groups in need of investment capital,
primarily into energy-saving technologies,
will be borrowing on international markets.
However, a large-scale default in the
private sector is unlikely, as debts tend to
be distributed among many entities and,
provided there are no massive shocks, any
defaults will only be local in nature.
Recommendations
Just as winter preparations are generally
carried out in the summer, the government
should pay attention to a number of issues
now, in order to minimize the risks later. To
prevent a default, first of all, the Budget
deficit needs to be kept down. If this is not
done, all other mechanisms are likely to
only accelerate or postpone a crisis. In
response to this kind of advice,
Government financial specialists always
respond, “That’s easier said than done.”
However, there are a slew of not very
onerous principles that can ensure the
reliability of public finances, but that, to all
appearances, Ukraine has not quite
mastered.
As there are problems with tax receipts,
that is, revenues are shrinking in
export-oriented sectors due to
deteriorating trade conditions and the loss
of markets, it is desirable, firstly, to openly
sequester the Budget rather of cutting
funding for specific items on an ad hoc
basis. Secondly, no opaque financing of
debts should be allowed, for example, such
as NBU loans to the Government as was the
case during 1990s, or forcing banks,
especially state-owned banks, to purchase
domestic T-bills. Thirdly, incentives for the
development of a stock market offering a
large choice of instruments will not only
facilitate debt servicing and a stronger
financial sector, but will also help the
government increase its debt without too
much fear.
Public debt management is critically
important. The state must continue to
support regular interest payments on the
principal in order to prevent a situation
where a large chunk of the national debt
has to suddenly be paid off in a short
period of time. There should also be
protection in the law for Budget items that
involve servicing the national debt.
See Vlast Deneg magazine, №22 (86), 
2 June 2006 at http://www.vd.net.ua/
journals/articles-1217?arch=1 (in Russian
only). For additional information, contact
ICPS economist Oleksandr Zholud by phone
at (380-44) 272-1050 or via e-mail at
ozholud@icps.kiev.ua.
At the moment, some of the greatest worries around the economic situation in
Ukraine concern public finances. A pre-election round of decisions to raise
social benefits yet again, growing prices for imported gas with the risk of
further increases have all put a strain on the Budget. Yet, weak economic
growth offers little grounds to believe that these additional expenditures will
be covered fully. Some are even talking about the possibility of a default
similar to that in the late 1990s. In an article for VLAST DENEG, ICPS economists
Oleksandr Zholud, Oleksiy Blinov and Yevhenia Akhtyrko conclude that a default
is improbable within the next few years and outlined the risk factors the
Ukrainian government should pay attention to
Default is not on the horizon
Key indicators of a possible default:
• rapid growth in the country’s
domestic and foreign debts; 
• a switch to shorter-term debt papers; 
• rapid growth in the yields for
domestic T-bills; 
• a growing share of Budget spending
to service debts and repayments; 
• a growing ratio between foreign debt
and central bank reserves.
